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Abstract. Central in standard possibilistic logic (where propositional logic for-
mulas are associated with lower bounds of their necessity measures), is the no-
tion of inconsistency level of a possibilistic logic base. Formulas whose level is
strictly above this inconsistency level constitute a sub-base free of any inconsis-
tency. Some extensions, based on the notions of paraconsistent completion of a
possibilistic logic base, and of safely supported formulas, have been proposed for
handling formulas below the level of inconsistency. In this paper we further ex-
plore these ideas, and show the interest of considering the minimal inconsistent
subsets in this setting. Lines for further research are also outlined.
Introduction
Reasoning under inconsistency [13, 6], or evaluating the inconsistency of a knowledge
base [10, 11] have raised a lot of interest in artificial intelligence for a long time. How-
ever, the different approaches which have been proposed do not usually take into ac-
count the fact that all the formulas a knowledge base are not necessarily equally cer-
tain. Possibilistic logic [8] provides a simple way for a partial handling of inconsistency
by taking advantage of a stratification of the knowledge base according to the certainty
level associated to the logical formulas. Then we can compute an inconsistency level for
a propositional knowledge base, and all the formulas whose certainty is strictly above
this inconsistency level form a consistent sub-base. The formulas whose certainty is
equal to or smaller than the inconsistency level remain drown in inconsistency, includ-
ing formulas that are not involved in any minimal inconsistent subsets. This state of fact
can be somewhat remedied by defining a paraconsistent completion of the knowledge
base, and by using a so-called safely supported entailment relation [3, 5]. Strangely
enough, this entailment is more productive than the possibilistic logic entailment, but it
nevertheless preserves the consistency of the set of consequences. Yet it has remained
largely ignored. This short paper revisits the approach and shows its relation with min-
imal inconsistent subsets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the flat case [4] where for-
mulas are not associated with certainty levels. We present the idea of paraconsistent
completion as a basis for analyzing the conflicts, and then identify the safely supported
consequences. In Section 3, we deal with possibilistic logic formulas, and extend the
previous definitions. Then a new characterization of safely supported entailment is pro-
posed. Lines for further research are also discussed.
Flat propositional knowledge bases
Let Σ = {pi | i = 1, . . . , n} denote a propositional logic knowledge base. Σ may be
inconsistent. Let us first recall two basic notions, needed in the forthcoming discussion:
the notions of support for a proposition and of minimal inconsistent subset. A Σ-based
support (or reason, or argument) for a proposition p is a subset Sp of propositions in
Σ such that i) Sp is consistent; ii) Sp ⊢ p (where ⊢ is the classical logic consequence
relation); iii) ∄S′ ⊂ Sp such that S′ ⊢ p. In other words, Sp is a minimal consistent
subset of propositions in Σ that together entail p. Likewise, a minimal inconsistent
subset of Σ is a minimal subset of propositions that entail ⊥: a non empty subset S⊥ of
Σ such that i) S⊥ is inconsistent (S⊥ ⊢ ⊥); ii) ∄S′ ⊂ S⊥ such that S′ ⊢ ⊥.
For a complete analysis of the inconsistency situation of formulas in Σ, we need to
define the “paraconsistent completion” Σcomp of Σ.
Paraconsistent completion
For analyzing the potential conflicts in Σ, it is convenient to proceed with the following
construction. The paraconsistent completion Σcomp of Σ is obtained by applying the
following procedure: to each formula pi in Σ, one associates i) the set of reasons for pi,
and ii) the set of reasons for ¬pi. More formally, Σ
comp =
{(pi, {P1, · · ·, Pr}, {C1, · · ·, Cs}) | pi ∈ Σ, Pi is a reason for pi, Cj is a reason for ¬pi}.
Clearly, if pi∈Σ, then (pi, {P1,· · ·, Pr}, {C1,· · ·, Cs})∈Σ
comp, and if ∃j s.t. pj ≡
¬pi then (¬pi, {P
′
1, · · · , P
′
s}, {C
′
1, · · · , C
′
r}) ∈ Σ
comp with ∀i P ′i = Ci, ∀j C
′
j = Pj .
Note that as soon as pi∈Σ, the set of reasons for pi is not empty: it contains at least
{pi}.
The reasons for and against pi can be summarized by triples of the form (pi, pii, γi)
for i = 1, . . . , n where pii ∈ {0, 1}, γi ∈ {0, 1}, and: i) pi ∈ Σ; ii) pii = 1 for
acknowledging the fact that ∃Pk, a reason for pi; iii) γi = 1 if ∃Cl that is a reason for
¬pi, and γi = 0 if ∄Cl (no reason for ¬pi). Let Σpara = {(pi, pii, γi) : i = 1, . . . , n}.
Note that pii 6= 0 (hence = 1), since each pi ∈ Σ supports itself.
If min(pii, γi) = 1, then pi is said to be paraconsistent (in the sense of “conflict-
ing”). Thus in Σ, there are two kinds of propositions, the formulas pi such as γi = 0
which should be considered as true, and the formulas that are paraconsistent. Note that
strictly speaking there is no formula of the form (pj , 0, 1) in Σ
para since the infor-
mation that pj is false appears there only under the form (¬pj , 1, 0), i.e. ¬pj is true.
However, note also that one may have (pi, {{pj}}, {C1,· · ·, Cs}) ∈ Σ
comp, where no
Ck contains ¬pj , which might be understood as suggesting that pj , being only sup-
ported by itself, is questionable. Besides, there is no formula of the form (pk, 0, 0) in
Σpara (it would express that there is no reason for pk, nor for ¬pk).
Safely supported propositions
Once Σcomp and Σpara are built from Σ, one can evaluate reasons S in favor of a
proposition p by means of the two evaluations, Def(S) and Uns(F ), respectively re-
vealing the potential weakness of its support and its lack of safety:
− Def(S)=mini{pii|(pi,pii,γi)∈Σ
para and pi∈S}.
In fact, one always have Def(S) = 1 since ∀i, pi ∈ S, we have pii = 1, and the case
Def(S) = 0 is impossible here since pi is in Σ (pi ∈ Σ is understood as (pi, 1)).
We shall see that when propositional formulas become weighted, we still always have
Def(S) > 0, but Def(S) may be “close to 0”.
− Uns(S)=maxi{γi|(pi,pii,γi)∈Σ
para and pi∈S}.
Clearly, Uns(S) = 0 if ∀i | pi ∈ S γi = 0, i.e. if S does not contain any paraconsistent
formula, while Uns(S) = 1 if ∃i | pi ∈ S γi = 1, i.e. there is at least one paraconsistent
formula in S. Thus, Uns(S) reflects if there are a reason pro and a reason against an
element of S that can be both built from formulas in Σ.
A reason S in favor of proposition p is free iff Def(S) > Uns(S), i.e. iff all the
formulas in S are believed to be true and none is inconsistent with other formulas in Σ.
By extension, in this case, we shall say all the formulas in S are free as well. Moreover,
any formula in a minimal inconsistent subset S⊥ = {r1, r2, · · · , rk} of Σ is not free,
since S⊥\{rj} is consistent and ∀j, S
⊥\{rj} ⊢ ¬rj . Thus, if ∃S
⊥, rj ∈ S
⊥ ⊆ Σ then
(rj , 1, 1) ∈ Σ
para, i.e., rj is a paraconsistent formula in Σ. If a formula is involved
in several minimal inconsistent subsets, one might think that this formula could be
considered as more “paraconsistent” since there exists several distinct reasons against
it. However, this looks debatable since a “basic” piece of information often used in
inferences may have some chance to be, on the contrary, strongly established.
In the classical case, Def(S) > Uns(S)⇔ Uns(S) = 0, since then Def(S) = 1.
Thus, a proposition p is safely supported if it exists a reason S for it which is free. The
safely supported propositions are just the consequences of the set of free ones. It follows
that the set of safely supported formulas in Σ is always consistent. So in particular, p
and ¬p cannot be both safely supported.
This departs from the so-called argumentative inference [2], which is more adven-
turous than the safely supported inference, since it may lead to an inconsistent set of
conclusions, but not to direct contradictions such as p and ¬p. The argumentative infer-
ence amounts to conclude p if there is a reason for p and no reason for ¬p in Σ.
For instance, consider the base Σ = {r,¬r ∨ p,¬r, r ∨ q}. Then, we can infer
both p and q argumentatively from Σ. In contrast, the reader can check that Σpara =
{(r, 1, 1), (¬r, 1, 1), (¬r∨p, 1, 0), (r∨q, 1, 0)}, from which one can infer neither that p
nor q is safely supported (in fact, no formula is free). Still, as recalled in the discussion
section, one can also infer (p, 1, 1) and (q, 1, 1) from Σpara, thus acknowledging that p
and q are indeed paraconsistent conclusions.
We now examine how the notions of reason, of paraconsistent completion, and of
safely supported proposition can become graded.
Possibilistic logic bases
We now assume that the propositions that are elements of a reason supporting a propo-
sition may be pervaded with uncertainty. More precisely, the propositions pi are now
replaced by possibilistic logic formulas [8] of the form (pi, ai), i.e., pi is believed with
certainty at least ai, ai’s belonging to a linearly ordered, bounded scale S = {s1 = 1 >
s2 > · · · > sn+1 = 0}, with top and bottom elements denoted by 1 and 0 respectively.
Let Σ = {(pi, ai) | i = 1, · · · ,m}, where ai is the strength with which pi is
believed to be true in Σ. The higher ai, the higher the strength. Thus, (p, a) is subsumed
by (p, b) as soon as b > a. So, it is assumed that Σ does not contain both (pi, ai) and
(pj , aj) with pi ≡ pj and ai 6= aj . Let Σ
∗ = {pi | (pi, ai) ∈ Σ}. Similarly, if S ⊆ Σ,
S∗ denotes the set of propositions appearing in the possibilistic formulas in S without
their weight. The set of propositions Σ∗ is not assumed to be consistent. In possibilistic
logic, this amounts to say that the inconsistency level of Σ is strictly positive [8].
A subset S of Σ is said to be a reason for p iff i) S∗ is consistent; ii) ∃a > 0,
S ⊢pi (p, a) where ⊢pi is the possibilistic logic entailment
1; iii) ∄S′ ⊂ S such that
S′ ⊢pi (p, b) with b > 0.
In other words, S is such that S∗ is a minimal consistent subset of propositions that
entail p and a is the minimum of the weights of the formulas in S. a is the weight of
the reason. Clearly there may exist distinct reasons S and S′ (with S∗ 6= S′∗) for p
in Σ. Thus the pair (S, (p, a)) is a (possibilistic) argument for p with strength a, with
a = min{ai | (pi, ai) ∈ S}.
Graded paraconsistent completions
On this basis, one can extend the completions Σcomp and Σpara to a possibilistic logic
base Σ. Namely to each formula pi in Σ
∗, one may associate i) the set of reasons for
pi, and the set of reasons for ¬pi, or ii) or only the weights of the best reason for pi and
of the best reason for ¬pi.
More formally, the first one is defined by
Σcomp = {(pi, {P1, · · · , Pr}, {C1, · · · , Cs}) | (pi, ai) ∈ Σ,
Pi is a (graded) reason for pi, Cj is a (graded) reason for ¬pi}.
The second completion is defined by
Σpara = {(pi, pii, γi) | (pi, ai) ∈ Σ, pii is the greatest weight of a reason for pi in Σ,
γi is the greatest weight of a reason for ¬pi in Σ}.
Note that pii ≥ ai.
Example. Σ={(p, s1), (¬p∨q, s2), (¬p, s3), (¬r, s4), (r, s5), (¬r∨q, s6)} (with s6 > 0)
Then Σpara =
{(p, s1, s3), (¬p ∨ q, s2, 0), (¬p, s3, s1), (¬r, s4, s5), (r, s5, s4), (¬r ∨ q, s2, 0)}.
Σcomp = {(p, {(p, s1)}, {(¬p, s3)}),
(¬ p ∨ q, {(¬p ∨ q, s2)}, ∅), (¬p, {(¬p, s3), {(p, s1)}), (¬r, {(¬r, s4)}, {(r, s5)}),
(r, {(r, s5)}, {(¬r, s4)}), (¬r ∨ p, {{(p, s1), (¬p ∨ q, s2)}, {(¬r, s4)}}, ∅)}.
Graded safely supported propositions
The notion of safely supported proposition then extends to possibilistic propositional
formulas with weights. Once Σpara is built from Σ, one can evaluate reasons S in
favor of pi in the following way, by means of the two measures [3, 5]:
- Def(S) = min{pii | ((pi, pii, γi) ∈ Σ
para and pi ∈ S
∗}.
- Uns(S) = max{γi | ((pi, pii, γi) ∈ Σ
para and pi ∈ S
∗}
Def(S) reflects the less certain belief in S, Uns(S) the most strongly attacked belief
in S. Note that we always have Def(S) > 0, but Def(S) may be equal to sn, and thus
now “close to 0”.
A reason is free iff Def(S) > Uns(S), i.e. iff its certainty is above the strength of
the strongest attack. Then a proposition p is safely supported if it exists a reason S that
1 Possibilistic inference is governed by the resolution rule
(¬p ∨ q, a), (p ∨ r, b) ⊢pi (q ∨ r,min(a, b)) [8].
is free for it. It can be shown [5] that the set of safely supported consequences of a base
Σ is always consistent. So in particular, p and ¬p cannot be both safely supported.
It clearly generalizes the case of a binary scale, i.e. a scale S with only two lev-
els 1 and 0 , (where the condition Def(S) > Uns(S) can only hold under the form
Uns(S) = 0), which means that all the formulas in S are fully believed and none is
attacked. In the graded case, the formulas involved in S are only more believed than
they are attacked.
Let us come back to minimal inconsistent subsets. Let S be a minimal inconsistent
subset in Σ∗, and let inc(S) = min{aj | (pj , aj) ∈ Σ, pj ∈ S} be the level of incon-
sistency of S. Then, inc(Σ) = max{inc(S) : S minimal inconsistent subset of Σ},
where inc(Σ) = max{a |Σ pi (⊥, a)} and pi is the standard possibilistic entailment
defined by possibilistic resolution [8]. Moreover, it appears that if (pi, pii, γi) ∈ Σ
para,
we have
γi = max{inc(Ck) : (pi, ai) ∈ Σ, pi ∈ Ck, Ckminimal inconsistent subset of Σ}
with inc(Ck) = min{aj | (pj , aj) ∈ Σ, pj ∈ Ck}. In fact we have the following result:
the safely supported entailment from Σ coincides with the possibilistic entailment from
the consistent possibilistic logic base Σcons obtained from Σ by deleting, in all minimal
inconsistent subsets S of Σ, the formulas with a certainty level equal to inc(S). Namely
Σcons = Σ\{(pi, ai) | (pi, ai) ∈ S, S minimal inconsistent subset of Σ, ai = inc(S)}.
Lines for further research
The construction of Σcomp and of Σpara is reminiscent of the motivations of Bel-
nap for introducing his well-known four-valued logic [1]. Belnap was considering sev-
eral sources of information for which an atomic formula p may be known to be true,
known to be false, or unknown. This may be naturally encoded by one of the four triples
(p, 1, 0) (p is held for true according to sources), (p, 0, 1) (p is held for false according
to sources), (p, 1, 1) (this is the paraconsistent case p is true according to some sources
and false according to others), and (p, 0, 0) stands for the case where the truth status of
p is unknown for sources. In Belnap’s calculus (p, 1, 1) and (q, 0, 0) yields (p∧ q, 0, 1),
which may appear strange at first glance. As pointed out in [7], this may be understood
in the following way. On the one hand, we have both an argument in favor of p true and
an argument in favor of p false. On the other hand we have no argument either in favor
of q true or in favor of q false. This is enough to build an argument in favor of p ∧ q
false (from the argument in favor of p false) and we cannot build any argument in favor
of p ∧ q true (since one has no argument in favor of q true).
Yet, there already exists an extension of possibilistic logic inference that can be de-
fined from Σpara (and then extended toΣcomp). It is based on the following generalized
resolution rule [9] where the paraconsistency of formulas can be propagated
(¬p ∨ q, pi1,γ1), (p ∨ r, pi2,γ2) ⊢ (q ∨ r,min(pi1,pi2),max(γ1,γ2)).
There is also another inference rule that holds in the logic of supporters [12], a logic
closely related to possibilistic logic, which corresponds to the case where there are no
reasons against in Σcomp, and where the scale S is binary:
(¬p ∨ q, P1), (¬p ∨ r, P2) ⊢ (¬p ∨ r, P1 ∪ P2).
This rule was proposed moreover in an ATMS-like perspective, where two kinds of
literals are distinguished, as in the following example:
Example. Given Assumptions = {A,B,C}, and the knowledge base Σ = {(p,A),
(q,B), (¬q ∨ p, C)}, p in Σcomp is then supported by two reasons, i.e., we have
(p, {{A}, {B,C, }}, ∅).
Such inference rules may provide the starting point for reasoning directly in terms
of arguments, and not only about arguments.
Concluding remarks
This short paper is intended to show that the benefit of taking into account the certainty
levels of formulas when reasoning under inconsistency may be still much higher than
the one already obtained by applying standard possibilistic logic where only formulas
strictly above the inconsistency level of the knowledge base are salvaged. Indeed when
inconsistency takes place, it is often due to the presence of formulas in which we are
not fully confident. Considering minimal inconsistent subsets provides a local view of
where the conflicts take place, and then the deletion of the less certain formulas inside
these subsets enables us to restore consistency while keeping more information than
with the standard possibilistic logic view.
References
1. N. D. Belnap. A useful four-valued logic. In: Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, (J. M.
Dunn and G. Epstein, eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 7–37, 1977.
2. S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade. Argumentative inference in uncertain and inconsistent
knowledge base. Proc. 9th Conf. on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Washington, DC,
July 9-11, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, 411–419, 1993.
3. S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade. Reasoning in inconsistent stratified knowledge bases.
Proc. of the 26 IEEE Inter. Symp. on Multiple-Valued Logic (ISMVL’96), Santiago de Com-
postela, Spain, 29-31 May, 1996, 184–189.
4. S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade. Some syntactic approaches to the handling of inconsis-
tent knowledge bases: A comparative study. The flat case. Studia Logica, 58, 17-45,1997.
5. S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade. An overview of inconsistency-tolerant inferences in pri-
oritized knowledge bases. In: Fuzzy Sets, Logic and Reasoning about Knowledge, (Dubois,
D., Prade, H., Klement, E. P., eds.), Kluwer Acad. Publ., 395–417,1999.
6. P. Besnard, A. Hunter (eds.) Reasoning with Actual and Potential Contradictions. Handbook
of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, v. 2, Kluwer, 1998.
7. D. Dubois. On ignorance and contradiction considered as truth-values. Logic J. of the IGPL,
16 (2), 195-216, 2008.
8. D. Dubois, J. Lang, and H. Prade. Possibilistic logic. In: Handbook of Logic in Artificial
Intelligence and Logic Programming, Vol. 3, (D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger, J. A. Robinson,
D. Nute, eds.), Oxford Sci. Publ., 439–513, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1994.
9. D. Dubois, J. Lang, H. Prade. Handling uncertainty, context, vague predicates, and partial
inconsistency in possibilistic logic. In: Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy Control , (D. Driankov, P. W.
Eklund, A. L. Ralescu, eds.), Springer, LNAI 833, 45-55,1994.
10. A. Hunter, S. Konieczny. On the measure of conflicts: Shapley inconsistency values. Artif.
Intell. 174(14),1007-1026, 2010.
11. S. Jabbour, Y. Ma, B. Raddaoui, L. Sais. Prime implicates based inconsistency characteriza-
tion. Proc. 21st Eur. Conf. Artif. Intellig. (ECAI’14), Prague, IOS Press,1037-1038, 2014.
12. C. Lafage, J. Lang, R. Sabbadin. A logic of supporters. In : Information, Uncertainty and
Fusion, (B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager, L. A. Zadeh, eds.), Kluwer, 381-392, 1999.
13. N. Rescher, R. Manor. On inference from inconsistent premises. Theory and Decision, 1,
179–219, 1970.
